ABSTRACT Global navigation satellite systems are now threatened by spoofing attacks. The double-antenna countermeasure is one of the most robust spoofing detection techniques. However, the existing doubleantenna countermeasure is based on the assumption that the measurements are synchronized, which may result in failure if the assumption is not valid. In the paper, we propose an unsynchronized model for the pseudorange and carrier phase measurements and discuss why these measurements are not suitable for spoofing detection when the measurements are not synchronized. In addition, a new detection method based on double-antenna power measurements is proposed. This method can be used in the unsynchronized case, extending the application of the double-antenna-based spoofing countermeasure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) can provide continuous, all-weather, and highly precise position, as well as velocity and time (PVT) results, to users all over the world. The GNSS service has been widely used in many applications [1] .
However, in the face of complex electromagnetic environments, the security and robustness of GNSS service can be seriously affected. A GNSS spoofing attack is one of the most malicious interferences that can misrepresent the navigation solution of a victim receiver. It is difficult to detect a GNSS spoofing attack because a GNSS spoofer generates falsified signals whose structure is similar to that of the authentic ones. Consequently, the falsified signals can be acquired and tracked by a commercial receiver without causing an alert. Such falsified signals are also called spoofing signals [2] .
Successful spoofing attack experiments on a car, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), a yacht and a power grid equipped with GNSS receivers have been reported [3] - [7] . These experiments show that a conventional commercial receiver usually cannot detect a well-designed spoofing attack.
Many GNSS anti-spoofing techniques have been developed [8] - [12] . One of the most robust spoofing detection techniques is the double-antenna-based method [13] - [17] . This method assumes that the spoofing signals come from a common source. Therefore, the double-antenna measurements usually have some correlation due to the same propagation path, whereas the authentic measurements do not have this correlation, which can be used to discriminate between the spoofing and the authentic signals. The position results, the pseudorange measurements, and the carrier phase measurements have been used to evaluate the correlation and detect spoofing attacks. When the receivers are spoofed, the signals received from antennas located separately will generate the same position results, and the double differences of the pseudorange and carrier phase measurements will be close to zero.
The existing double-antenna-based methods require that the measurements of different antennas be synchronized. To this end, two receivers can be slaved to a common oscillator, or their measurements can be interpolated to a common epoch with precisely time-stamped measurements [14] . However, a common oscillator is not practical in many cases, particularly for multiple mobile receivers. Additionally, precise time stamping requires reliable timing results, which are usually available after a reliable GNSS navigation solution is obtained. However, the GNSS service is very likely to be unreliable in a low-cost receiver under a spoofing attack.
In this paper, we present the unsynchronized models of the differential pseudorange and carrier phase measurements and demonstrate that these measurements are not suitable for spoofing detection when they are not synchronized. The experiments show that the pseudorange measurements perform poorly when the antennas are closely spaced, and the carrier phase measurements cannot detect spoofing attacks when the unsynchronized timing offset between the antennas is greater than several microseconds. In this study, we modify the double-antenna power based method which we have proposed in reference [18] to address this problem and analyze how the method can still perform when the measurements are not strictly synchronized. This method can extend the applications of the double-antenna-based spoofing countermeasure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the existing countermeasures based on the pseudorange and carrier phase measurements. Next, the unsynchronized models of each of these countermeasures are presented. Section III proposes the double-antenna method based on power measurements. Section IV introduces the spoofing detection methodology and evaluates the performance. Section V provides the experimental results for real GNSS spoofing attacks and compares the detection performance of the different measurements. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II. EXISTING COUNTERMEASURES BASED ON DOUBLE-ANTENNA MEASUREMENTS A. IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURE
The implementation architecture of a double-antenna based spoofing detection system is shown in Fig. 1 . The two processing units in the figure represent independent receivers connected by communication links or parallel processing modules embedded in one receiver. The measurements are fed into a data analysis module and categorized. Measurements that are categorized as authentic are used for navigation computation. If some measurements are categorized as spoofing, a warning is produced and the corresponding measurements can be used to obtain additional information, such as the location of the spoofer, by extracting the characteristics of the spoofing signals.
Existing double-antenna-based methods detect spoofing attacks by comparing the position results, the pseudorange measurements or the carrier phase measurements of different processing units and the measurements of the different units are assumed to be synchronized. However, this assumption is not always accurate in practical applications. To analyze the unsynchronized case, we present the unsynchronized doubleantenna model for the pseudorange and carrier phase measurements in this section.
B. PSEUDORANGE-BASED METHOD
The pseudorange measurements of the ith satellite of antennas a and b can be expressed as follows [1] , [15] :
where r a i (t) denotes the geometric distance between the ith satellite and the phase center of antenna a, c denotes the speed of light, δT a (t) denotes the clock error of the receiver connected to antenna a, δT i (t) denotes the clock error of the ith satellite, I a i (t) and ζ a i (t) are the ionospheric and tropospheric time delays, respectively, at the antenna a, and The clock error of the satellite changes slowly and thus it can be viewed as constant for a short period. The ionospheric and tropospheric time delays at the two antennas are also very similar because the antennas are closely spaced. Therefore, the single difference of the pseudorange measurements can be expressed as follows:
where
. Then, the double difference of pseudorange measurements is given as follows:
are zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), the noise of the double differential measurement is still AWGN.
When the spoofing signals are received and processed by the victim receiver, the pseudorange measurements of the ith satellite at the antennas a and b are given as follows:
where r i (t) denotes the falsified range measurements of the ith satellite at the transmitter of the spoofer. d a and d b are the distance from the transmitter of the spoofer to the antennas a and b, respectively, and δT s (t) denotes the clock error of the spoofer. Similarly, the double difference of the pseudorange measurements of the two spoofing signals can be given as follows:
Based on the above analyses, the following hypothesis test can be obtained:
The signals represent spoofing and authentic signals under H 0 and H 1 , respectively. When the measurements of the two antennas are synchronized (i.e., t 1 = t 2 ), ∇ r a,b i,j (t 1 , t 2 )| spf equals 0. Therefore, the double difference of the pseudorange measurements is merely noise, and the hypothesis test becomes the following:
It should be noted that when one of the signals is authentic and the other is a spoofing signal, ∇ r a,b i,j (t 1 , t 2 ) does not equal 0. In other words, when the test statistic indicates H 1 , it cannot be concluded that both the ith and jth signals are authentic, but it can be inferred that at least one of the signals is authentic. In contrast, when the test statistic indicates H 0 , both the signals can be categorized as spoofing signals.
C. CARRIER PHASE-BASED METHOD
The carrier phase measurements of the ith satellite of antennas a and b are given as follows [15] :
where λ denotes the wave length of the signal and N a i is an integer corresponding to the cycle ambiguity of the ith satellite at antenna a. Then, the single difference of the carrier phase measurements can be expressed as follows:
Then, the double difference of the carrier phase measurements is given as follows:
Therefore, the double difference of the carrier phase measurements in units of cycles is given as follows:
Similar to (5), the double difference of the carrier phase measurements of the two spoofing signals can be given as follows: (12) In (11) and (12), the ∇ N a,b i,j is an integer. Therefore, the following statistic can be used to simplify the double difference measurements:
where round(A) is the function that rounds A to the nearest integer. Then, similar to the pseudorange-based method, the carrier phase-based hypothesis test is given as follows:
where i,j (t 1 , t 2 )| spf and k under spoofing are equal to zero [15] . Consequently, the hypothesis test becomes
It can be observed from (7) and (15) that the signals can be considered to be spoofing signals when the double difference of the pseudorange or carrier phase measurements is close to zero. However, this method may not be valid when the measurements are unsynchronized, as shown in (6) and (14) .
III. A NOVEL COUNTERMEASURE BASED ON DOUBLE-ANTENNA POWER MEASUREMENTS
The C/N 0 of two antennas with different gain patterns has been used for spoofing detection [19] . The C/N 0 is defined as the ratio of the power of the desired signal to the noise density. Because estimating the noise density can induce additional error, in this paper, we use the correlation outputs VOLUME 6, 2018 of the code tracking loop, which can represent the signal plus noise power, for spoofing detection [18] . In contrast to the work in [19] , the proposed method does not require the gain patterns of the antennas to be distinct. As a consequence, this method is more suitable for common anti-spoofing applications. We introduced the power-based method in [18] , but without a detailed theoretical analysis and methodology. In this section, we present the working principle of the method. First, we introduce the in-phase and quadrature coherent outputs of the ith satellite:
where a i denotes the amplitude of the signal, d i denotes the navigation message, f ei and φ ei are the frequency and carrier phase tracking errors, respectively, T coh denotes the coherent integration time, R(τ i ) denotes the autocorrelation function of the pseudorange code, τ i is the time difference between the prompt local code and the received signal, and ω Ii and ω Qi are the zero-mean AWGN. Then, the signal-plus-noise power can be expressed as follows:
where N nc is the non-coherent integration times and T s is the time interval of the observation. Next, we define the doubleantenna power ratio (PR) as follows:
According to the appendix, PR is distributed according to a normal distribution, whose expectation and variance can be approximated by
where µ a and µ b are the expectations of P a and P b , respectively, and σ a and σ b are the variances of P a and P b , respectively. The power measurements can also be expressed as
where t 1 and t 1 are the receiving time and propagation time of the signal, respectively. P Ti denotes the transmitting power of the ith satellite, G T i is the gain of the antenna of the ith satellite, L a i denotes the power loss of the propagation, G a R denotes the gain of antenna a, el a i and az a i denote the elevation and azimuth angles of the ith satellite, respectively, and L a R denotes the power loss after the antenna.
The power ratio between the measurements of the two antennas is given by
Since the powers of the signals change gradually, and the distance between the two antennas is much shorter than the distances between the satellite and the antennas, P Ti (t 1 − t 1 ) is approximately equal to P Ti (t 2 − t 2 ). Therefore, (22) can be simplified as follows:
Then, we define the differential power ratio (DPR) as follows:
The expectation of the DPR is given by (25), as shown at the bottom of this page. When the receiver receives spoofing signals from a common source, the power loss of the propagation for different signals are equivalent, i.e., L i = L j , and the elevation and azimuth angles of the different signals are also equivalent, i.e., el i = el j and az i = az j . Therefore, the expectation of the DPR can be given by (26), as shown at the bottom of this page.
Next, the following hypothesis test can be obtained:
where ω DPR is the zero-mean AWGN according to (19) , (20) , and (24).
IV. METHODOLOGY
The models for the double differential pseudorange, the double differential carrier phase, and the DPR are described in Section II and III. In this Section, the methodologies for spoofing detection are proposed with synchronized and unsynchronized measurements based on the models.
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A. SYNCHRONIZED MEASUREMENTS
When the measurements are synchronized, the differential measurement for H 0 (i.e., the receiver is processing spoofing signals) will be noise with zero mean value. However, the differential measurement for H 1 (i.e., the receiver is processing authentic signals) is very likely to be a non-zero value plus noise.
To develop a more robust detector that can discriminate between the above two cases, a period of measurements is considered. A detector has been proposed in [15] for the carrier phase measurements when the antennas are synchronized. Here, in order to model the measurements more accurately, especially for the power measurements, a small change is introduced. Since the relative motion between the satellites and the antennas of the receiver continuously changes, the measurements gradually change. Thus, the differential measurements can be modeled as a second-order polynomial in a short period of time.
The length of the data is N . Therefore, n ranges from 1 to N . It can be observed that the data is in the form of a linear model as follows:
Then, the problem can be rewritten as a linear model as follows:
Therefore, the above problem turns into the classic linear model [20] . The generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) detector decides H 1 if
where r and p denote the number of rows and columns in A, respectively, and the maximum likelihood estimator of θ is given as follows:θ
By setting a false alarm probability P FA , the threshold γ can be determined as follows [20] :
where F r,N −p denotes an F distribution with r numerator degrees of freedom and N − p denominator degrees of freedom. Then, the detection probability is given as follows [20] :
where F r,N −p (λ) denotes a noncentral F distribution with r numerator degrees of freedom, N − p denominator degrees of freedom, and noncentrality parameter λ. The noncentrality parameter is given as follows [20] :
Based on the above analyses, if the test statistics are below the threshold γ during a period of time, both the ith and jth satellites are suspected to be spoofing satellites. If all the T (x i,j ) for the different i and j are all below the threshold, it can be inferred that all the signals come from the same source, and the navigation solution has been falsified and should not be used.
When the receiver acquires and tracks the authentic and spoofing signals simultaneously, some of the test statistics will be below the threshold and others will be above the threshold. This problem is more complex, but the spoofing discrimination can still be performed with clustering or graph-based methods [8] , [15] . Since the main objective of this study is to compare the spoofing detection performance of the pseudorange, carrier phase, and power measurements, this problem is not discussed in detail in this paper.
B. UNSYNCHRONIZED MEASUREMENTS
When the measurements of the two antennas are unsynchronized, the double differential pseudorange and carrier phase measurements are no longer zero-mean noise for H 0 . Therefore, spoofing detection cannot be performed with these two types of measurements. However, since the DPR does not require highly synchronized measurements, as shown in (26), (27) is still valid. As a result, the DPR can still be applied for spoofing detection when the two antennas are not synchronized well.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS
To validate the analyses in Section IV, we perform real GPS spoofing experiments and detect the attacks with the abovementioned measurements. In the experiments, the receiving antenna of the spoofer receives GNSS signals in the L1 band and sends them to the meaconer. Then, the signals are delayed and sent to the transmitting antenna. Next, the spoofing signals are transmitted to the receiving antennas of the victim receiver. The distance between the two antennas of the victim receiver is 50 centimeters. The synchronization module can adjust the time bias between the double-antenna measurements. The overall configuration of the experiments is shown in Fig. 2 .
In the experiments, the pseudorange, carrier phase, and power measurements are recorded every second. The data length of one processing window is set to 60 seconds. Therefore, N equals 60.
A. RESULTS OF THE SYNCHRONIZED MEASUREMENTS
The double differential pseudorange, double differential carrier phase, and DPR based on the synchronized measurements are shown in Fig. 3 . Figure 3 (a), (c), and (e) shows the double differential pseudorange, double differential carrier phase, and DPR without spoofing, respectively. Since the antennas are close to each other, the distance between the antennas is smaller than the errors of the pseudorange measurements. Therefore, the double differences of the pseudorange measurements of the different satellites are not clearly distinguishable. In contrast to the pseudorange, the carrier phase can be measured much more accurately. The non-zero element of the carrier phase measurements can be clearly observed in Fig. 3 (c) . The measurements gradually change with the variation in the satellitereceiver geometry. Similar to the carrier phase measurements, the DPR measurements also change with time. The test statistics T (x) corresponding to the measurements in Fig. 3 are shown in Fig. 4 . The logarithm was taken for better comparison. Figure 4 (a), (c) , and (e) shows the T (x) of the different measurements without spoofing and (b), (d), and (f) shows the T (x) under spoofing attacks. The threshold is shown with blue dotted lines and is calculated with a false alarm probability P FA = 0.001 based on (35). The test statistics of the pseudorange measurements without spoofing are close to the threshold because the antennas are closely spaced. The detection performance of the pseudorange measurements improves when the distance between the antennas is larger. In most cases, the test statistics of the carrier phase and power measurements exceed the threshold in the spoofing-free environment. However, the test statistics under the spoofing attack are all below the threshold. These results are consistent with the analyses in Section IV-A.
B. RESULTS OF UNSYNCHRONIZED MEASUREMENTS
The double differential pseudorange, double differential carrier phase, and DPR based on unsynchronized measurements are shown in Fig. 5 . All the results in the figure are under spoofing attacks.
The unsynchronized timing offsets of the double-antenna systems are 10 µs and 1 ms in the left and right subfigures, respectively. When the timing offsets between the measurements of the two antennas is 10 µs, the double differences of the pseudorange measurements of the different satellites are still close to each other. This is because the distance a satellite travels in 10 µs is only several centimeters. This bias can hardly be observed in the pseudorange measurements since it is much smaller than the measuring error. However, the double differences of the carrier phase measurements begin to disperse. This is because the carrier phase measurements can be accurately measured. Therefore, a centimeter-level bias can be observed.
When the timing offset between the antennas is 1 ms, the double differences of the pseudorange measurements also begin to disperse. The double differences of the carrier phase measurements separate completely, which is indistinguishable from the case without spoofing. It can be inferred that the detection performance of these two types of measurements degrades when the timing offset between the two antennas increases. In contrast to the pseudorange and carrier phase measurements, the DPR based on the double-antenna power measurements are all close to zero in Fig. 5 . Although the variance in the DPR increases slightly when the timing offset between the antennas increases, the main term in the DPR is still a zero-mean noise, indicating that the DPR can be applied for spoofing detection when the measurements of the antennas are not well synchronized.
The test statistics T (x) corresponding to the differential measurements in Fig. 5 are shown in Fig. 6 . Figure 6 (a), (c), and (e) shows the T (x) when the timing offset between the antennas is 10 µs. The test statistics of the pseudorange measurements are still below the threshold. However, the test statistics of the carrier phase measurements exceed the threshold, indicating that the carrier phase measurements can no longer detect spoofing attacks. Figure 6 (b), (d), and (f) shows the T (x) when the timing offset between the antennas is 1 ms. The test statistics of the pseudorange measurements are near the threshold, and most of the test statistics of the carrier phase measurements exceed the threshold. These results show that the statistics based on the pseudorange and carrier phase measurements are not suitable for spoofing detection when the antennas are unsynchronized.
As shown in Fig. 6 (e) and (f), the test statistics of the DPR are still below the threshold, indicating that they can be applied for spoofing detection when the antennas are unsynchronized. These results are consistent with the analyses in Section IV-B. 
C. PERFORMANCE UNDER DIFFERENT DOUBLE-ANTENNA TIMING OFFSETS
It can be concluded that the pseudorange measurements are not suitable for spoofing detection when the double antennas are closely spaced. The power measurements can detect spoofing attacks and their performance is relatively stable regardless of whether the antennas are synchronized or not. The spoofing detection of the carrier phase measurements performs the best among the three measurements when the antennas are synchronized, but the performance quickly deteriorates when the double-antenna unsynchronized timing offset increases. This subsection shows how the timing offset affects the detection performance of the carrier phase measurements.
First, we record the synchronized double-antenna measurements every second. The overall data length is half an hour.
∇ r a,b
i,j (t 1 , t 2 )| spf in (12) can represent the geometric bias induced by the double-antenna unsynchronization and can be calculated with the positions of the antennas and satellites. The positions of the satellites at t 1 can be obtained directly, and those at t 2 can be calculated by interpolation using the satellites' positions at t 1 and t 1 +1. Then, the unsynchronized differential measurements can be approximately obtained by adding ∇ r a,b i,j (t 1 , t 2 )| spf to the synchronized differential measurements.
The probabilities of spoofing detection based on carrier phase measurements versus double-antenna timing offsets are shown in Fig. 7 . The lines with different markers represent the results corresponding to the different satellite pairs. The results are all distinct because the satellite-antenna geometries are different for different satellites. The test statistics indicate that the carrier phase measurements perform well in spoofing detection when the timing offset is less than 1 µs. However, the detection performance begins to deteriorate when the timing offset is between 1 and 5 µs, and most of the detection probabilities are close to zero when the timing offset is greater than 5 µs. The results in Fig. 7 show that the double differences of the carrier phase measurements can be used to detect spoofing attacks when the unsynchronized timing offset is below 1 µs; however, they are not suitable for spoofing detection when the timing offset between the antennas is greater than several microseconds.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the unsynchronized models for the double differential pseudorange and carrier phase measurements are presented. We demonstrate that these measurements are not suitable for GNSS spoofing detection when the doubleantenna measurements are not synchronized. To detect the spoofing attack with unsynchronized measurements, a novel approach based on power measurements is proposed, and the methodology of the method is developed with the GLRT. The experimental results from real GNSS spoofing attacks illustrate that all the measurements can detect spoofing attacks when the measurements are synchronized, whereas only the power-based method can perform in an unsynchronized case. The proposed method extends the applications of the doubleantenna-based GNSS spoofing detection method.
APPENDIX PROOF OF EQUATION (19) AND (20)
According to (17) , P i is distributed according to a noncentral χ 2 distribution, with 2N nc degrees of freedom [21] . The noncentrality parameter is given as follows:
where (C i /N 0 ) Hz is the carrier to noise ratio of the ith satellite in Hz. According to the property of the noncentral χ 2 distribution, the mean value and variance of P i are given as follows [21] :
According to the central-limit theorem, P i is approximately distributed according to a normal distribution when N nc is sufficiently large. In other words, P i ∼ N (µ i , σ i ). Then, the coefficient of variation can be given as follows:
The C/N 0 is usually above 30 dB-Hz in practical applications, and the integration time T coh is set to 1 ms. Therefore, (41) can be further simplified as follows: 
When N nc is very large, σ i µ i and the coefficient of variation is very small.
According to [22] and [23] , the ratio of two Gaussian variables can be approximated as another Gaussian variable when the coefficient of variation of the denominator is sufficiently small. Therefore, the ratio between the power measurements of the two antennas is approximately distributed according to a normal distribution, whose expectation and variance can be approximated by [24] E(
where Cov(·, ·) denotes the symbol of covariance. The absolute value of the Pearson correlation coefficient between the double-antenna power measurements is given as follows:
Consequently, the absolute value of the second term on the right side of (43) becomes the following:
In addition, the third term on the right side of (43) becomes the following:
Therefore, the expectation in (43) can be further simplified as follows: 
